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Princesses are bigger than Elephants: effect size as a category error in evidence based 
education. 
 
Adrian Simpson 
School of Education, 
Durham University 
 
 
Abstract 
 
Much of the evidential basis for recent policy decisions is grounded in effect size: the 
standardized mean difference in outcome scores between a study’s intervention and 
comparison groups. This is interpreted as measuring educational influence, 
importance or effectiveness of the intervention. This paper shows this is a category 
error at two levels. At the individual study level, the intervention plays only a partial 
role in effect size, so treating effect size as a measure of the intervention is a 
mistake. At the meta-analytic level, the assumptions needed for a valid comparison 
of relative effectiveness of interventions on the basis of relative effect size are 
absurd. While effect size continues to have a role in research design, as a measure of 
the clarity of a study, policy makers should recognize the lack of a valid role for it in 
practical decision making. 
 
 
The Size of Elephants 
Adam photographs an elephant. The elephant’s image covers 0.2 of the area of the 
photograph. 
 
Belinda photographs another elephant. Her elephant’s image covers 0.3 of the area of her 
photograph. 
 
Simon compares these numbers, concluding the second elephant must be the larger. 
 
Catherine collects many photographs of elephants. For each she works out the ‘photo-size’ 
of each elephant (the proportion of the photograph filled by the elephant’s image) and, 
averaged across the collection, finds a photo-size of 0.18. 
 
Douglas collects photographs of princesses. The average photo-size of princesses in his 
collection is 0.24. 
 
Tabitha compares these numbers, concluding princesses are bigger than elephants, 
cautioning this does not mean a particular princess is bigger than any particular elephant: 
this is about averages. 
 
Uri draws together Catherine’s work (with other collections of elephants), Douglas’s work 
(with other collections of princesses) with averaged photo-sizes from multiple collections of 
microbes, politicians, sea-creatures, white rhinos, ants and many other categories. He 
produces a league table: politicians and microbes towards the top, ants and white rhinos 
This is an Accepted Manuscript of a paper to appear in British Educational Research Paper 
towards the bottom. This league table is promoted as the ‘best bet’ for indicating which 
creatures are really bigger or smaller, with caveats about assumptions needed to interpret 
it. 
 
This story is clearly designed to expose the argument’s absurdity. An object’s physical size 
plays only a partial role in photo-size, so it is a category error to treat relative photo-size as a 
proxy for relative physical size. Only if Simon had reason to believe Adam and Belinda used 
the same camera and lens and had stood the same distance away, might he legitimately 
argue that Belinda’s elephant is the larger.  
 
Similarly Tabitha’s conclusion that relative averaged photo-size can act as proxy for relative 
averaged actual size relies on strong assumptions: that other elements affecting photo-size 
are distributed equally for photographs of princesses and for photographs of elephants. 
 
The same assumptions are needed for Uri in comparing actual average sizes of classes of 
creatures on the basis of relative averaged photo-sizes. Not only are these heroically strong 
assumptions (which Uri leaves unchecked), it is clear they cannot be met. They require that 
the design decisions of photographers are distributed equally across areas, but 
photographers do not use the same cameras for microbes and politicians; nor stand at the 
same distance when photographing white rhinos and ants. Design decisions vary 
systematically between areas, so the argument for using relative photo-size as relative 
actual size is invalid. 
 
This paper will show identical, fundamentally flawed arguments underpin much of the 
‘evidence based education’ movement. First, effect size does not measure the effectiveness 
of an intervention (nor its educational importance or influence) since the intervention plays 
only a partial role in the calculation of effect size. Second, when comparing studies, relative 
effect size can be a proxy for relative effectiveness of interventions only in the highly 
restricted circumstances that all other factors impacting on effect size are equal. Third, 
when comparing groups of studies, relative averaged effect size can be a proxy for relative 
average effectiveness for types of intervention only in the highly restricted circumstances 
that all other factors impacting on effect size are distributed identically across those groups 
of studies. While meta-meta-analysts may assume those circumstances hold, they do not: 
instead, these factors vary systematically between types of intervention. 
 
Evidence Based Education 
There is a growing movement in educational research and policy described as ‘evidence 
based education’ or ‘evidence informed education’. The UK government promotes an 
evidential hierarchy which sees randomised controlled trials (RCTs) and meta-analyses of 
trials as the highest standards of evidence for policy makers (Campbell and Harper, 2012). 
 
A key measure dominates this approach to policy: ‘Effect size’ 1. These are reported in (or 
can be calculated from) individual studies; studies are collated according to some criteria 
                                                        
1 The paper uses ‘effect size’ to mean standardised mean difference (in keeping with most educational  
literature), retaining ‘raw effect size’ for the difference between the mean scores of the groups (unscaled by a 
measure of spread). Working with raw effect size (or other forms of effect size, such as odds ratios and 
correlation coefficients) addresses some but not all of the issues raised. 
and their effect sizes averaged in meta-analyses. Meta-analyses are further aggregated on 
broad educational areas, in meta-meta-analyses, from which rankings are constructed. For 
example, the Educational Endowment Foundation (EEF) produces a ‘teaching and learning 
toolkit’ purporting to give “information about the relative effects of different approaches to 
improving learning” (Higgins and Katsipataki, 2016, p.237). Hattie (2009) used a similar 
meta-meta-analysis to indicate the ‘relative efficacy of different influences that teachers 
use’2 (p.6). ‘Relative’ in both statements means relative averaged effect size. 
 
These meta-meta-analyses are heavily promoted to policy makers. For example, a recent UK 
government paper encourages teachers to use the toolkit, arguing it “sets out what works 
and what doesn’t” (Department for Education, 2016, p. 37), with the toolkit being consulted 
by nearly two thirds of school leaders (NAO, 2015). 
 
Concerns about meta-analyses and meta-meta-analyses have been raised from the 
beginning. Many questioned the coherence of the collection of studies (the so-called ‘apples 
and oranges’ issue, Eysenck, 1984).  Certainly there are categorisations that make little 
sense:  the EEF area ‘mastery learning’ collects studies on Bloom’s learning for mastery and 
Keller’s personalised systems of instruction with mathematics mastery approaches from 
Singapore and Shanghai. The last concept has little in common with the first two: they 
simply share a name. Linda Wang (personal communication) likens this to combining a 
nutritional measure of boiled leaves with a nutritional measure of the British evening meal 
to obtain a measure for ‘tea’.  
 
Similarly, it is not clear that "digital technology" combining computer-based frog dissection, 
the impact of colour animations of 3D vectors and using video in vocabulary development is 
a coherent category. At times, meta-analysts seem less like they are combining apples and 
oranges, than combining aphorisms and orangutans.  
 
While acknowledging the category coherence as a crucial issue alongside many others (e.g. 
publication bias and study quality), this paper focuses on the measure used to combine and 
compare those interventions.  
 
Effect Size 
The roots of effect size do not lie in measuring effectiveness of interventions, but in 
evaluating the research design process. Cohen (1962) introduced it to see if psychology 
studies were designed with good ‘power’: a good chance of finding a difference between 
groups (provided there was, in fact, a real difference to be found). That is, it was not 
developed to quantify the results of a study, but to help plan higher quality studies.  
 
At its simplest, a study might have a planned intervention treatment, a comparison 
treatment against which it is contrasted, a sample of participants assigned (preferably 
randomly) to the treatments and some test taken afterwards. The researcher’s interest has 
traditionally been whether there is a difference in test scores (which might be attributed to 
the difference in treatments). 
                                                        
2 Albeit ‘sickle cell anemia’, ‘gender’, ‘self-assessment’ and other areas in Hattie (2009) could not be described 
as things ‘teachers use’: the work often confuses ‘influences’, ‘correlations’ and ‘interventions’. 
 
To explore the notion of statistical power, Cohen introduced standardized effect size (often 
called Cohen’s d), commonly taken to be the mean test score of the comparison group, 
subtracted from the mean score for the intervention group, divided by some measure of 
spread of scores3.  
 
The chance of detecting a difference between the groups does not only depend on d, but 
also on the size of sample and the significance level (often 0.05). A researcher might 
estimate how large this effect size might be in the population from which they draw their 
sample. Power analysis allows them to adjust the size of their sample to improve the chance 
that the difference between the groups would be deemed ‘statistically significant’: large d 
may be detectable with smaller samples, but if d is expected to be small, researchers may 
need a larger sample. 
 
The focus on detecting a difference has been questioned: researchers became concerned 
that very small effect sizes were detectable with very large samples and so worried that 
unimportant between-group differences were reported as ‘statistically significant’ without 
differentiating them from important differences. It was argued we needed some way of 
measuring ‘practical significance’ (Kirk, 1996).  
 
Effect size came to be used to compare individual studies and aggregations of studies, with 
relative effect sizes standing for relative effectiveness of interventions. This switched the 
role of effect size from before the experiment (supporting design) to after the experiment  
(interpreting results). Interventions in studies with larger effect sizes are now promoted as 
more important or influential than interventions in studies with smaller effect sizes. 
 
As an example, take Gray and Alison’s (1971) study of an intervention treatment involving 
three twenty-minute homework tasks per week for four weeks; a comparison treatment 
having similar classroom teaching (on fraction arithmetic), but no homework; with grade 6 
pupils in a suburban Canadian school being randomly assigned to the two conditions; with a 
test on the material prepared by the researchers. They found the intervention group 
averaged 22.29 (with standard deviation 1.82) and the comparison group averaged 21.21 
(with standard deviation 2.94). Depending on the particular definition chosen, the 
standardized mean difference is about 0.45. 
 
While some compare effect sizes between individual studies as a basis for policy 
recommendations (e.g. Wasik & Slavin, 1993; Gorard, Siddiqui & See 2017), effect size is 
most commonly encountered by policy makers in meta-analyses and meta-meta-analyses. 
These averaged effect sizes are promoted as more accurate measures of the effectiveness 
of interventions which can be compared to identify more or less effective interventions.  
 
When Gray and Allison’s study is aggregated with other studies of primary school homework 
in the EEF toolkit, an average effect size of 0.10 is obtained. This is small compared to other 
                                                        
3 Different research designs have different definitions of effect size (Lakens, 2013), though analysts often 
neglect to convert between them. Definitions differ even for independent means designs assumed here, 
particularly in regard to measuring spread. Some use standard deviation of the comparison group and others 
the pooled standard deviation of both groups.  
areas (e.g. ‘feedback’ or ‘meta-cognition’) so primary school homework interventions are 
promoted as less effective than interventions from these other areas. 
 
This paper shows this argument is flawed in two fundamental ways. Just as the 
identification of relative photo-size with relative actual size is a category error, so is the 
identification of relative effect size with relative effectiveness of interventions. Second, just 
as using relative average photo-size as proxy for relative average actual size requires 
assumptions which will not hold, the paper shows that using relative averaged effect sizes 
to provide an ordering of the effectiveness of classes of interventions requires assumptions 
which obviously do not hold. 
 
The misidentification of effect size with the intervention 
It is clear from its definition that the identification of effect size from a study with the 
effectiveness of the intervention is a category error. The definition has three explicit 
elements: the mean intervention group test score; the mean comparison group test score 
and the spread of those scores. Each element can be altered (affecting effect size) as a 
result of design decisions, without altering the intervention. Since the effect size does not 
depend solely on the intervention it cannot be a straightforward measure of the 
intervention’s effectiveness.  
 
While one may argue that, all other things being equal, these other elements are factored 
out by averaging across studies; it should be clear that all other things are not equal: tests, 
samples and comparison activities vary systematically between educational areas. 
 
The paper outlines simple thought experiments showing how each design factor results in 
studies with different effect sizes for identical interventions, along with illustrations from 
studies and meta-analyses. 
 
Effect size at the study level 
a) The comparison treatment 
 
In the example above, researchers chose to compare three homework tasks to no 
homework: a reasonable decision in the context of their study. In different circumstances 
researchers may have chosen a comparison treatment with one homework task, or two; or 
given the same number of tasks in a different form. Doing so would not change the 
intervention treatment (or the sample or test), but each study would result in a different 
(presumably smaller) effect size. 
 
The impact of choice of comparison treatment can sometimes be seen in individual studies. 
In evaluating the ‘catch up numeracy’ programme (NFER, 2014), the evaluators used two 
comparison groups (with the same intervention, test and sample). The intervention 
treatment was a particular numeracy curriculum delivered one-to-one. The first comparison 
treatment was ‘business as usual’: the normal teaching regime. The second comparison 
treatment was delivery of  ‘time equivalent’ one-to-one numeracy support with content 
chosen by teaching assistants, provided it was not ‘catch up numeracy’. The comparison to 
the first group led to an effect size of d=0.21 while the effect size comparing the 
intervention and second groups appeared much smaller and negative (around d=-0.05).  
 
Examination of meta-analyses also highlights the role of the comparison treatment. 
Bangert-Drowns et al. (1991) collected studies of frequent testing: those comparing 
frequent testing to no testing had average effect size 0.56; studies comparing frequent 
testing to two or more tests per semester had 0.07. Again, the more active comparison was 
associated with much smaller effect sizes. 
 
Most extremely, meta-analyses sometimes include studies with starkly inactive 
comparisons: not teaching the topic at all. For example, Steenbergen-Hu and Cooper’s 
(1994) meta-analysis for intelligent tutorial system interventions includes studies where the 
comparison activity was human tutoring (average d=-0.25) and studies where the 
comparison was reading computerised material (average d=0.25). Most interestingly a 
group of studies had ‘no treatment’ comparisons (average d=0.90) including a study with a 
sample with no previous economics teaching, using an intervention treatment teaching 
economics using an intelligent tutoring system, while the comparison group were not taught 
economics at all; the outcome was measured with an economics test – unsurprisingly the 
effect size was rather large, around d=1.5 (Shute & Glaser, 1990). While some may argue 
that researchers should know that effect sizes are relative to comparison treatments, meta-
analysist show no qualms in combining very different comparison treatments in a single 
average (here, d=0.35), with meta-meta-analysts using that summary value to rank order 
interventions (e.g. Schneider & Preckel, 2017). 
 
The choice of comparison activity is neither arbitrary nor random; researchers select it to 
meet their intentions, within restrictions laid down by convention and practicality. Where 
possible, having a less active comparison allows increased power (the chance of detecting a 
group difference) and therefore effect size without altering the intervention. 
 
Thus it is a category error to read relative effect sizes as relative effectiveness of 
interventions, let alone to assume they signal educational importance, relevance or 
influence.  
 
b) Sample 
 
The choice of sample can impact on effect size for a study in two interacting ways, 
independent of the intervention, control treatment or test. The first follows from the 
definition of effect size: the more homogenous the sample on the outcome measure, the 
higher the effect size. The second relates to the mechanism through which the intervention 
treatment works. 
 
The first issue has long been known (e.g. Fitzgibbon, 1984), albeit meta-analysts rarely 
address it4. Fixing intervention treatment, comparison treatment and test, the researcher 
can choose a sample with a wider or narrower range of ability. They may do so explicitly to 
increase power (and hence effect size) as some recommend (e.g. Lipsey, 1990), or implicitly 
                                                        
4 Despite its prevalence throughout the EEF Toolkit, only one meta-analysis appears to mention range 
restriction: this is to acknowledge that they introduced range restriction problems by trimming outliers (Kluger 
& DiNisi, 1996). 
 
because the focus is on a particular ability range or because a restricted ability range is 
convenient.  Bobko, Roth and Bobko (2001) note that adjusting for this requires knowing a 
great deal about the samples or making assumptions which may be little more than 
guesswork. Few educational meta-analyses appear to attempt adjustment: most just ignore 
the issue. 
 
The second issue with the sample is that an intervention may be expected to work 
differently with different people – in particular, effectiveness may vary with pre-existing 
ability. A computer based activity aimed at improving test taking techniques may be 
effective with pupils struggling with such techniques; so, a sample consisting of these pupils 
may show a larger (raw) difference in mean scores on a suitable test. The same activity may 
be ineffective with confident test takers; so, a sample of those may show little difference in 
mean scores (Martindale, Pearson, Curda and Pilcher, 2005). 
 
The closer the researcher can match choice of sample to the people for whom the 
intervention’s underlying mechanism is effective, the larger the mean difference. The more 
general the sample, including people for whom the intervention is ineffective, the smaller 
the mean difference (and also the wider the spread).  
 
These two issues (differential effectiveness and range restriction) are easy to conflate. In the 
first, a particular intervention may disproportionately affect part of the population and so a 
researcher may target their study towards them. In the second, the researcher may increase 
experimental power (explicitly or implicitly) by restricting the range of the sample: in a 
population with similar ability, a small raw difference in achievement will stand out clearly 
simply because of the reduced spread. 
 
These issues also interact: if one study conducted with lower achieving groups has a higher 
effect size than an otherwise identical study with wider ability groups, without adjusting for 
range restriction it is difficult to tell whether the intervention is better targeted at lower 
achieving pupils or whether restricted range has inflated effect size. 
 
However, the key issue is that studies with the same intervention (and same comparison 
treatment and outcome measure) can have very different effect sizes with different 
samples. Again, this demonstrates that identifying relative effect sizes with relative 
effectiveness of interventions is a category error. 
 
c) Tests 
Perhaps the most obvious research design choice is the selection of outcome measure – 
most frequently a test which the participants take at the end of the treatments.  
 
A simple thought experiment shows the sensitivity of effect size to the test, holding 
intervention, comparison treatment and sample constant. If we split a sample of pupils 
randomly in two and teach one group an isolated fact which no-one in the sample knew 
(e.g. ‘oktatás’ is the Hungarian word for ‘education’, assuming non-Hungarian speakers), 
then a test requiring the reproduction of that fact, would lead to a potentially infinite effect 
size5. Minor changes to the test results in very different effect sizes: for example, translating 
10 otherwise unknown Hungarian words (including ‘oktatas’) in a four-option multiple 
choice test would give an expected effect size around 0.6; with three options it would be 
around 0.4; with ten options it would be around 0.9 6. Removing the ‘oktatás’ question 
would result in an expected effect size of 0. Despite wildly different effect sizes, the 
intervention is the same in each case (as are the sample and comparison treatment). 
 
In Gray and Allison’s (1971) homework study with fraction arithmetic, the researchers 
designed a test of fraction material themselves, but could have made other design 
decisions. They could have tested a wider selection of mathematical topics; they could have 
selected from a bank of appropriate standardized tests (which would vary in the number of 
fraction arithmetic questions); they could (unadvisedly) have used a reading test7.  
 
Again, it is possible to see the impact of test selection on effect size in individual studies. In 
their evaluation of the ‘response to intervention’ literacy programme, Gorard, Siddiqui and 
See (2014) report d= +0.19 for the ‘New Group Reading Test’ and -0.09 for the ‘Progress in 
English’ test. In their evaluation of the Nuffield Early Language intervention, Sibieta, Kotecha 
and Skipp (2016) used a variety of different outcome measures, including a grammar test 
(d=0.29), an expressive vocabulary test (0.25) a letter sound knowledge test (0.12) and a 
word reading test (0.01). The same intervention, sample and comparison treatment results 
in very different effect sizes depending on the test. 
 
Cheung and Slavin (2016) looked at 645 studies across twelve meta-analyses across a wide 
range of topics. They separated studies using tests designed by the researchers from studies 
with ‘standardised tests’ (tests designed by others to cover a particular area of the 
curriculum, often having been norm referenced, designed for particular age ranges etc.) 
Across the studies, effect sizes for standardized tests were around half those of researcher 
designed tests. 
 
Few have explored reasons for this difference. Ruiz-Primo, Shavelson, Hamilton and Klein 
(2002) propose an explanation around curricular distance: 
 
At the immediate level, artifacts from the enactment of the curriculum provide 
achievement information. At the close level, assessments should be curriculum 
sensitive; they are close to the content and activities of the curriculum. At a proximal 
level, assessments should be designed considering the knowledge and skills relevant 
to the curriculum, but content (e.g. topics) can be different from the one studied in 
the unit. At a distal level, assessment may be based on state or national standards in 
                                                        
5 If translating ‘oktatás’ was one of ten, otherwise unknown, Hungarian words on the test, nearly everyone in 
the intervention group would score 1 out of 10 (with little variance) and nearly everyone in the comparison 
group would score 0 (with little variance). A raw mean difference of 1, divided by a zero (or a very small) 
standard deviation. See Simpson (2018) 
6 For example, with four options, the intervention group would average 3.25 (one correct, nine guessed); the 
comparison group would average 2.5 (all ten guessed) with standard deviation around 1.4 (the intervention 
group’s variation being slightly smaller – they guess fewer answers). 
7 But test-intervention match is not always obvious: note the use of mathematics tests to evaluate a 
philosophy intervention (Gorard, Siddiqui and See, 2015a) and a chess intervention (Jerrim, Macmillan, 
Micklewright, Sawtell & Wiggins, 2017) 
a particular domain. At a remote level, general measures of achievement should be 
used (p.371) 
 
They found effect sizes between two and five times larger for close assessments than distal 
ones. 
 
However, the characterization Ruiz-Primo et al. make is of curricular distance, rather than 
the mechanism impacted by the intervention: one might think of a fractions test as 
immediate and a public mathematics examination as distal, but an intervention which 
makes a very great difference to (say) mathematical reasoning ability may show up more 
clearly on a general mathematics examination than on a specific fractions test. So, rather 
than curriculum distance, it may make sense to talk of how closely a test matches the 
mechanism which the intervention impacts. 
 
A test focused on what it is that the intervention does to the pupils (compared to the 
comparison) will lead to a larger effect size. However, even in an intervention with a very 
narrow outcome (such as improving procedural fraction addition), researchers may be 
constrained to use a standardized test. But they can still select to maximise power (and 
increase effect size) by choosing, say, a numeracy test rather than a more general 
mathematics test.  
 
Again, there are other subtleties with test choice. Depending on the consistency of the test 
items, increasing the size of a test may increase effect size (though equally, adding 
irrelevant items will tend to decrease effect size by adding noise8). This is bound up with 
design decisions and researchers’ freedoms and constraints: a long test may be impractical, 
piloting a test may have led to changes which increase its reliability (and therefore effect 
size) etc. 
 
Selecting a test is a design decision which, for fixed intervention, sample and comparison 
treatment, can result in very different effect sizes. So, again, taking relative effect size as a 
measure of relative effectiveness of interventions is a category error. 
 
Comparing effect sizes: individual studies 
Just as the only way that Simon can draw the valid conclusion that Adam’s elephant is really 
smaller than Belinda’s on the basis of their photo-size is if all other components that impact 
on photo-size are equal, the only way of validly comparing the effectiveness of two 
interventions on the basis of effect size is to be sure that the test, sample and comparison 
activity are the same. 
 
It is rare for researchers to directly compare individual studies by effect size to draw out 
policy advice. However, Gorard, Siddiqui and See (2017) compared seven literacy 
interventions9. While some had tests in common, some had populations which might be 
considered similar and some had similar comparison treatments, no pair of studies shared 
all of the three components needed to allow a valid comparison. For example, the 
                                                        
8 Continuing the Hungarian example, a four-option multiple choice test with five unfamiliar words (including 
‘oktatás’) might have an expected effect size of around 0.8, with twenty words we might expect 0.4. 
9 Though one, ‘Philosophy for Children’, was not obviously targeted at literacy. 
Philosophy for Children intervention (Gorard, Siddiqui & See, 2015a) used a wide range of 
pupils (in-tact, mixed ability primary year 3-6 classrooms) and measured outcomes using 
gains between the national Key Stage 1 and 2 tests; Accelerated Reader (Gorard, Siddiqui & 
See, 2015b) used a narrower range (year 7 pupils with lower attainment) with post-test 
scores from the standardized New Group Reading Test A10. Similarly, Wasik & Slavin (1993) 
compare studies of five reading recovery programmes partly on the basis of effect size, no 
two of which are convincingly comparable on test, sample and comparison treatments. 
 
Advising schools to select between these interventions on the basis of effect size is a 
mistake. At the individual study level, effect size can act as proxy for the effectiveness of the 
intervention only if all other components of the effect size are the same. While it may be 
argued that one might compare effectiveness of interventions on the basis of effect size 
provided these components are similar (rather than the more stringent requirement of 
being the same), the argument above shows that seemingly minor changes to the range of 
the sample, the comparison activity and the outcome measure can have large impact on 
effect size. So, those who argue we can accept comparing, combining or rank ordering 
interventions on the basis of effect size based on similar tests, comparison treatments and 
samples would need conversion factors relating some clearly defined metric for ‘similarity’ 
on each of these dimensions to impact on effect size. While, as noted above, such a 
conversion factor exists for range restriction, there is little evidence that it is used and it 
requires highly detailed knowledge about sample distributions (or reliance on still more 
assumptions). Further, it is not clear that one can, even in principle develop such 
conversions for the other factors. 
 
Comparing Effect Sizes: Meta-analysis 
While comparing interventions on effect size for individual studies is rare, comparing 
aggregated effect sizes is common and is the basis of the meta-meta-analyses used to direct 
‘evidence based education’ policy. This is done in two ways: an individual study’s effect size 
is compared against a standard, or the average effect size over one collection of studies is 
compared to the average effect size of another collection. 
 
In the first case, the comparison of a single study to a group of studies is often implicit. 
Researchers sometimes report their study’s effect size as ‘small’, ‘medium’ or ‘large’ 
depending on cut-off points derived from  previously aggregated effect sizes (Levin, 1997). 
For example, Hattie (2009) averages all effect sizes in the collection of meta-analyses to 
calculate a ‘hinge’ (d=0.4), above which, it is argued, is a ‘zone of desired effects’. This is 
used as a benchmark for the relative value of an individual study. Given the sensitivity of 
effect size to sample, test and comparison treatment, this is a mistake.  
 
More often effect sizes are averaged in meta-analyses and then compared (e.g. Schneider 
and Preckel, 2017) or effect sizes from meta-analyses are further aggregated in themes and 
then ranked (e.g. Hattie, 2009; Higgins and Katsipataki, 2016). For example, the EEF toolkit 
combines seven meta-analyses under the heading of ‘meta-cognition’ and reports an effect 
size of 0.62 and combines eight meta-analyses under ‘behaviour interventions’ and reports 
                                                        
10 There are further issues in comparing effect sizes between study designs which use ‘gain scores’ and which 
use end of treatment scores only (see Baguley, 2009) 
an effect size of 0.25. This is promoted as evidence that schools are likely to find more 
potential for improving achievement with meta-cognition interventions than behavioural 
ones.  
 
This argument is invalid: It may be possible to identify circumstances when relative 
aggregated effect sizes might be proxy for relative effectiveness of interventions, but to 
assume these hold without checking seems neglectful, and checking shows they do not 
hold. 
 
Recall that the average photo-size of one set of creatures being larger than the average 
photo-size of another warrants a valid conclusion that the average real size of one group of 
creatures is larger only if an ‘all other things being equal’ (in distribution) assumption holds. 
Only if the distribution of lenses and distances for elephant photographers and princess 
photographers were the same – either systematically or randomly – in Catherine’s and 
Douglas’s collections, might the argument work. 
 
This same requirements apply to meta-analysis. To make a valid comparison between 
averaged effect sizes stand as a valid comparison of effectiveness of the interventions, the 
other elements impacting on effect size have to be distributed equally across the meta-
analyses (or meta-meta-analyses). 
 
It is important to note that ‘haphazard’ is not enough, ‘not systematically different’ is 
necessary but not sufficient and even ‘at random’ is not sufficient. It is not enough to argue 
that a collection of studies has varying tests, samples and comparison treatments; to note 
that no deliberate attempt has been made to restrict on these components; to undertake 
moderator analyses of these components; nor to contend that the set of studies passes 
homogeneity tests (which are anyway tests of distributions of effect sizes, not of 
components of effect sizes). 
 
It has to be the same distribution across all other components: either the same by design or 
by drawing at random, independently from the same distribution. If around three-quarters 
of the studies in one area use low achieving pupils, around three-quarters of the studies in 
the other meta-analysis need to be similarly range restricted. If 10% of the studies in one 
area use ‘no teaching at all’ as a comparison treatment, then around 10% of studies in other 
areas need to use ‘no teaching at all’. 
 
Berk and Freedman (2001) contend that ‘statistical assumptions are empirical 
commitments’: the assumptions on which an argument relies commit the arguer to a claim 
about the nature of the world which resulted in the data. For example, to validly argue that 
relative average photo-size is a proxy for relative average actual size, we commit to how the 
world of photography must be – that lenses and distances to subjects are equally 
distributed across different areas – and it is possible to at least sense check, if not 
empirically confirm, whether the world is like that. Even at the sense check level, the 
assumption appears absurd: wildlife photographers make design decisions systematically 
different from those of portraitists which are different again from micro-biologists.  
 
It should be possible to sense check education meta-analyses and meta-meta-analyses for 
similar empirical commitments, even though the analysts neglect to do this. In this case, the 
assumptions require (among other things11) that the joint distribution of tests, comparison 
treatments and sample ranges is the same in the different collection of studies. At the sense 
check level, this is clearly unlikely and an exploration of some collections of studies below 
shows it does not hold: different educational areas have different conventions and 
freedoms within which researchers make design choices and this leads to very different 
distributions.  
 
For example, researchers of feedback disproportionately use ‘no feedback’ comparison 
conditions. Meta analysts of phonics disproportionately collect studies which use literacy 
tests. The EEF toolkit designers took the decision to only look at meta analyses of setting 
and streaming with low achievers while averaging more widely in other areas. Comparing 
the effectiveness of interventions across these areas on the basis of relative average effect 
size is not a valid form of argumentation.  
 
Schneider & Preckel (2017) rank (among many other meta-analyses) averaged effect sizes 
from a set of studies for intelligent learning systems (d=0.35, Steenbergen-Hu & Cooper, 
2014) with that for testing aids (d=0.34, Larwin, Gorman & Larwin, 2013). To argue, then, 
that these types of intervention are about equally effective because the effect sizes are 
close requires that the other elements which impact on effect size (test, comparison 
treatment and sample) are distributed in the same way in each set.  
 
They are not:  take one component, the distribution of comparison treatments. 
Steenburgen-Hu & Cooper (2014) include studies with a wide variety of comparison activity 
(as noted above, from comparing to human tutoring, through to not teaching the topic at 
all), while Larwin, Gorman & Larwin (2013) include only studies where the comparison 
treatment involves no testing aids at all. These cannot be described as studies with the 
same distribution of comparison treatments.  It would seem highly unlikely that any two 
meta-analyses would have the same distribution of comparison treatments, let alone that 
across all pairs of educational areas in a meta-meta-analysis, the distribution of comparison 
treatments would be equal. 
 
Distributions of tests are also unequal.  Means, Toyama, Murphy and Baki (2013) report that 
26% of the tests in their meta-analysis of online and blended learning are tests of 
declarative knowledge; Höffler & Leutner (2007) report that 7% of their studies of use of 
instructional animation used tests of declarative knowledge. Springer, Stanne & Donovan’s 
(1999) meta-analysis of small group teaching reported 60% of studies used mathematics 
tests, while Luiten, Ames & Ackerson’s (1980) meta-analysis of advance organisers reports 
22% of studies used mathematics tests. Yet these are ranked against each other in 
Schneider and Preckel (2017) purportedly to allow “for comparisons of the relative 
importance of a wide range of variables for explaining academic achievement in higher 
education, which can inform researchers, teachers, and policymakers” (p. 566) 
  
                                                        
11 for example, that effects of interventions across different studies are constant (for fixed effect meta-
analyses) or distributed normally around some mean (for random effect meta-analyses). These too are 
empirical commitments which go unchecked and are, prima facie, unlikely. 
The same issue appears in the meta-analyses which underpin the EEF toolkit: e.g. Kulik & 
Kulik (1982) report that 82% of their studies on ability grouping use standardized tests; 
Paschal, Weinstein and Walberg (1984) report that 48% of their studies on homework use 
standardized tests. The assumption about the distribution of tests being the same across 
collections is clearly not met. 
 
In terms of range restriction, of Lou, Abrami & d’Apollonia’s (2001) set of studies on group 
and individual learning with technology, 13% use low ability participants; Luiten et al. (1980) 
report 26% of their studies involve low ability participants. At the meta-meta-analysis level, 
the EEF toolkit areas are combined sometimes deliberately with different ranges of 
participants: for ‘setting and streaming’, the average effect size comes only from meta-
analyses where 100% of studies use low attainers12; of the studies in the meta-analyses 
which make up the ‘summer school’ area, around 70% had attainment as a criteria for the 
sample (most being low attainment); other areas, such as ‘meta-cognition’, predominantly 
use broader samples. The assumption that the distribution of the range of samples is equal 
across collections of studies is clearly not met.  
 
It is not just that we can find pairs of meta-analyses which obviously vary in distributions of 
comparison, test and range features, it is also clear that it we should not expect to get the 
same distributions in any pair of meta-analyses, since the nature of the area under 
investigation often restricts the distribution of these factors differentially. 
 
For example, it would be unethical to evaluate a behaviour intervention where the 
comparison activity involves no behaviour intervention. However, many laboratory based 
studies of feedback interventions compare to ‘no feedback’ treatments (Simpson, 2017). 
Ranking ‘feedback’ above ‘behaviour interventions’ on the basis that relative averaged 
effect sizes act as proxy for relative effectiveness of interventions is clearly invalid. 
Interventions which target pedagogical approaches to an academic topic directly (such as 
feedback, meta-cognition and homework) are more likely to use researcher-designed tests 
focused on the subject content; while interventions less directly aimed at a pedagogical 
approach for a particular academic topic (such as behaviour interventions, school uniforms 
or aspiration interventions) are more likely to use general, standardised tests. We cannot 
therefore conclude that direct forms of instruction are more effective than indirect 
approaches simply because average effect sizes are larger. 
 
Not only do the assumptions required for using relative averaged effect sizes as proxy for 
relative effectiveness of interventions fail a sense check, the empirical commitments they 
entail are unrealistic. 
 
What are effect sizes? 
The argument above shows that relative effect sizes are not measures of relative 
effectiveness of interventions at individual study or meta (or meta-meta) analysis levels. 
Effect sizes refer to the study process as a whole (just as photo-size of a creature refers to 
                                                        
12 Interestingly, many of the studies (including one whole meta-analysis) are about within-class grouping, so 
not obviously ‘setting and streaming’ at all. 
the photography process as a whole and is not an appropriate measure of the actual size of 
the creature).  
 
They may be better thought of as a measure of the clarity of the study (Simpson, 2017) – 
they indicate how clear the difference between the treatments was on the sample, as 
measured on the test. With different measures, the difference may be clearer. More 
homogenous samples may make the difference stand out more. More active comparison 
treatments may make the difference less detectable. 
 
Effect size was developed for this notion of detectability, through power analysis. Indeed, 
for a fixed sample size and significance level, effect size and the chance of detecting a 
difference (if one exists) are essentially the same. The discussion above has important 
implications for power analyses. Lipsey (1990) and Levin (1997) suggest careful research 
design decisions are a valid alternative to increasing sample size for increasing power (and 
therefore increasing effect size). 
 
It is often recommended that researchers look to studies of similar interventions to find an 
estimate of the effect size to determine power and sample size (e.g. Murphy, Myors & 
Wolach, 2014). But the argument above highlights that the intervention is only one 
component. It is possible that, since the researchers intend to conduct a study in the same 
area as others, they may use similar tests, comparisons and samples, but one should check 
this is the case and base power analyses on studies which are similar not just on 
interventions, but also on these other components.  
 
This problem can be seen in large scale (and expensive) evaluation programmes. In 
commissioning studies of interventions, the EEF have pilot, effectiveness and efficiency 
stages: each phase likely to be commissioned (and receive extra funding) partly on the basis 
of previous effect sizes. But later phases are more likely to require standardised tests and, 
perhaps, wider samples. First, by equating promise of the intervention with the effect size of 
the study, they make the category error discussed above; second, by ignoring the impact 
that changes to test, sample and comparison treatment has on effect size, studies often end 
up underpowered, with few detecting effect sizes as large as those assumed in power 
analyses. Across the 32 effectiveness reports published by the EEF at the time of writing, not 
one found an effect size as large as the minimum detectable effect size (MDES) used at the 
planning or protocol stage – on average the reported effect size was under two-fifths of the 
MDES. 
 
Reporting effect size is important for future researchers. By selecting studies as near to their 
planned design (not just the intervention) as possible, they can conduct valid power 
analysis. Effect sizes are not, however, suitable for policy making. 
 
The Role of Context, Resources and Intentions 
Photographers make decisions on the basis of context, resources and intentions. They may 
be able to get close to some subjects, but not others; they may not be able to afford a 
telephoto lens; they may be aiming to submit the photo for publication (where a wildlife 
editor will want considerable context and a portrait editor may not). A picture of a newly 
isolated microbe may be taken so the image dominates the photograph; while almost any 
picture of a rare white rhino is worth taking even if there is no time to get close. 
 
Researchers too work in societies where contexts, resources and intentions matter. For 
many studies, the aim may be to show an intervention ‘worked’ or not – in the sense of 
finding a statistically significant difference between intervention and comparison groups 
(provided one exists). Improving power by increasing sample size is one possibility, but can 
be resource intensive and may not always be available, so selecting more homogenous 
samples or more focussed tests may be sensible design decisions. Funders may add 
restrictions on acceptable design and the culture of the researchers’ discipline may reduce 
their freedoms. 
 
So researchers with an eye on a journal publication may choose tests they have designed 
themselves, to increase power; while those asking for funding from the EEF will tend to 
propose standardised tests. Laboratory based research may allow for ‘no treatment’ 
comparisons; field research may not. Researchers interested in social justice may be more 
likely to conduct studies with low achievers, while researchers interested in scaling a 
promising intervention to evaluate broader applicability will likely use a wide sample. 
Context, resources and intentions all impact on design and design impacts on effect size, 
separately from the intervention. Moreover those contexts, resources and intentions vary 
systematically between educational areas; one cannot just assume this systematic variation 
away because doing so is convenient. 
 
Conclusions 
Understanding that effect size is a property of the whole study, not just the intervention 
may help us avoid reifying concepts such as the ‘effectiveness of the intervention’ which 
may have little straightforward meaning.  
 
For example, the meaning of ‘the effect of feedback’ is far from clear. ‘Evidence based 
education’ proponents often claim inspiration from pharmacology, yet we would dismiss 
arguments about ‘the effect of aspirin’ that drew on studies of aspirin against a placebo, 
aspirin against paracetamol, aspirin against an antacid and aspirin against warfarin on 
measures as diverse as blood pressure, wound healing, headache pain and heart attack 
survival. Yet we are asked to believe in an ‘effect for instructional technology’ based on 
comparing interactive tutorials to human tutoring, to reading text, to ‘traditional 
instruction’ and to not being taught the topic at all, on outcomes as diverse as 
understanding the central limit theorem, writing simple computer programs, completing 
spatial transformations and filling out account books13.  
 
The assumptions for comparing meta-analyses and meta-meta-analyses require that design 
factors are distributed equally across different areas of education, yet clearly researchers in 
different areas make systematically different decisions. In Berk’s (2011) deconstruction of 
meta-analysis he notes that even small deviations from assumptions invalidate the 
                                                        
13 It could be argued that these are all measures of achievement and standardising makes them comparable. 
The argument applied to aspirin would be that the outcomes are all measures of health, yet standardising does 
not somehow make them sensibly comparable. 
inferential argument, leaving “statistical malpractice disguised as statistical razzle-dazzle” 
(p.199) 
 
Freedman (2009) lists specious defences used by those who would razzle-dazzle policy 
makers. Among these are “you can’t prove the assumptions are wrong”14, “If we don’t do it 
someone else will” and “the decision maker has to be better off with us than without us”. It 
is possible to read many of these defences in the work of prominent authors in the 
‘evidence based education’ movement (e.g. Higgins and Katsipataki, 2016; Schneider & 
Preckel, 2017; Hattie, 2017).  
 
Amongst Freedman’s defences, the most telling may be “where’s the harm?”. Harm comes 
in presenting policy conclusions as ‘evidence based’ when the evidential chain of argument 
is broken. The ‘evidence based education’ movement promotes a doctrine based on 
providing “solid evidence of effectiveness” leading to “genuine, generational progress 
instead of the usual pendulum swings of opinion and fashion” (Slavin, 2002).  
 
As Henry Fielding (1749) said of the religious doctrine relating virtue and happiness, this is 
“a very wholesome and comfortable doctrine, and to which we have but one objection, 
namely, that it is not true.” 
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